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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

DONALD A. WILLIAMSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD COMP ANY,

Case
No.
12387

a <'Orporation,
Defendant-Respondent
Appeal from Judgment of the Third Judicial District
Oourt for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the sake of clarity, the parties herein will be
designated as they were in the trial below. Donald
A. Williamson will be ref erred to as the plaintiff, and
the defendant, Rio Grande Western Railroad will be
referred to as the defendant.
A jury trial was held before the Honorable Judge
J. S. Sawaya, commencing November 23, 1970. This trial
involved two causes of action.
The first cause arose as a result of an industrial
accident which occurred on the 25th day of November,
1967 (Tr. 15 ). At that time the plaintiff was working

as a member of a switch crew of the def end ant, spotting
cars at the Watson Warehouse in Salt Lake City, Utah
(Tr. 17). The plaintiff suffered a twisting accident
occasioned by being caught bebveen a loading dock
and a moving box car (Tr. 19). He was seen by Dr.
Philip Howard on that date at the Holy Cross Hospital
emergency room. X-rays disclosed fractures of the 9th,
10th and 11th ribs (Tr. 68). It was tl1ought he might
have a ruptured kidney, however, examination ruled
that out. He did have a questionable fracture of the
pelvis. This diagnosis was confirmed by Dr. Paul
Pemberton as being fractures of the 9th, 10th, and 11th
ribs err. 93), together with the questionable fracture
of the ilium (Tr. 93).
The accident was caused by the failure of a .Mr.
Jaeger whose job was to cut cars and pass signals.
At the time of the accident he was not where he should
have been and, as a result, could not have passed the
signals (Tr. 16, Tr. 19). The switch foreman assumed
full responsibility for the failure of Mr. Jaeger to be
in the proper position (Tr. 22). Had .Mr. Jaeger been
in the proper position to pass signals, the accident
would not have occurred (Tr. 40). 'rl1ereafter, the
plaintiff executed a release for his injuries sustained
in that accident (D. 36). He also received a check in
payment of that release (D. 37). He did so in reliance
of a letter from Dr. Howard dated January 11, 19G8,
Exhibit 14, and a letter from Dr. Pemberton, dated
J anuary 11, Exhibit 21. He also talked to the doctors
who advised him that he had no permanent injuries.
Dr. Howard x-rayed the plaintiff's spine, found nothing
1
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wrong with the spme. He concluded that there would
he no permanent injuries. Dr. Pemberton also examined
the plaintiff, he also found no injuries to the back or
spine (Tr. 97). He found no abnormalities in and
about any disc space (Tr. 98). Dr. Pemberton further
testified that in the type of crushing injury sustained in
the accident of November 25, one would not expect a disc
involvement (Tr. 117).
The jury found for the def end:mt on the first
cause of action and affirmatively answered one written
interrogatory propounded by the Court, as follows:
"Was the release entered into March 22, 1968
and admittedly executed by the plaintiff, a valid
and binding release of all claims of the plaintiff
and against the defendant by reason of the occurrence of November 25, 1967."
It must be concluded, therefore, that the jury
determined that the plaintiff suffered no disc or spine
injury as a result of the November 25, 1967 injury.

On March 4, 1968, the plaintiff visited Dr. Pemberton and complained about some pain over the outer
aspect of his right hip (Tr. 99). Dr. Pemberton dragnosed it as a muscle spasm or a bursitis over the right
hip (Tr. 99). This involved the trochanter nerve. Dr.
Pemberton again saw the plaintiff on March 18 and
he was still having pain over the top of the trochanter.
On June 14, 1968, the plaintiff saw Dr. Charles Hall.
At that time Dr. Hall made the following record:
"This man has some pain in the right buttocks
and above the greater trochanter on the right
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hip with extension down the upper back of the
thigh, since an industrial injury of N overnber 25,
1967 for which he saw Dr. Howard."
Dr. Hall diagnosed his condition as a mild right
sciatic neuritis which is an inflama+ion of the nerve
and concluded that he had some irrit:i1 ion of the sciatic
nerve, presumably on the basis of a disc problem (Tr.
159). He concluded that this disc problem originated
at the time of the injury of November, 1967. On th.e
basis of this testimony, the plaintiff moved the Court
for an Order finding that if the jury should find that
the plaintiff did, in fact, receive an injury to his back
and spine on November 25, 1967, that the relase was,
in fact, invalid as to those injuries (Tr. 238). This
motion was denied. It was argued again at the time of
the motion for a new trial. 1'he Court again denied
plaintiff's motion.
1

The plaintiff's second cause of action is predicated
upon an injury sustained October 17, 1968 at approximately 6 :00 a.m. and at that time plaintiff was working
as a member of a switch crew. Larry Hannigan was
foreman of that crew and Steve Willey was the third
member (Tr. 43). At the time of the accident, plaintiff was riding on the side of a car. The foreman
ordered the car stopped. He waited until the car
stopped to get off. He stepped down rm what is known
as a bridle rod plate (Tr. 178). As he stepped on the
plate, it slipped out from under him, his foot slipped
down in between the areas between the ties, he twisted
and fell down, spraining his ankle and injuring his
back.
4

The switch foreman saw the plaintiff riding on
the side of the car, standing on the ladder on the side
of the lead or first box car. Mr. Hannigan then gave a
stop sign (Tr. 4-5). He then went to the intercom system and was talking to the yard master and did not
see any accident. As soon as he completed talking to
the yard master, he turned around and walked to where
Mr. Williamson was standing. He was standing at the
57 switch holding his back, appeared to be in pain, and
told the switch foreman that he had hurt his back
(Tr. 46). The foreman then examined the area and
determined that the switch plate had fallen down between the ties (Tr. 46). The other switchman, Mr.
Willey, knew that the plaintiff had fallen and hurt his
back (Tr. 80), but did not see the accident happen because he was a considerable distance away from the 57
switch (Tr. 84).
The bridle rod plate (Tr. 47) is also known as a
switchplate (Tr. 84). A bridle rod is a rod approxithat runs from
mately one and one-hialf inch in
the switch to the switch points and which moves the
switch points back and forth as the switch is moved.
The bridle rod goes from the switch stand to the switch
points. There is a space of approximately one foot in
width between two switch ties in which it is placed
(Tr. 47). The purpose of the bridle rod plate, or switch
plate, is to prevent people from stepping into the space
between the rails occupied by the bridle rod and hurting
oneself. At this time the switch plate was not fastened
in any way (Tr. 49). They are normaJly spiked down
on all four corners (Tr. 50).
5

Examination of Exhibits 7, 8, and 9, will show the
precise switch that was involved at the accident, the
bridle rod plate secured on all four corners by what are
obviously spikes. It was the duty of the railroad section
gang to see that the plates were prop0rly secured (Tr.
50) and to warn if they were not so secured.
There were no lights in the area except directional
lights that were located upon the switch stand. They
had a green and yellow opaque lense, Exhibit 10, stood
approximately seven or eight feet above the ground (Tr.
51), and were used for the sole purpose of informing
switchmen as to which way the switch was lined (Tr. 51).
The switch light was lit by a kerosene lantern (Tr. 51).
Mr. Hannigan, the plaintiff's foreman, had worked
with the plaintiff before, had never known of him to
have any back problem, had never seen him bend over
or hold his back, had never heard him complain of
his back and had, to his observation, never had any difficulty performing the duties of a switchman prior to
October 17, 1968 (Tr. 53).
The plaintiff saw Dr. Charles Hall on October 21,
1968. He advised him at that time he had stepped into
a hole. On April 9, 1969, the plaintiff was hospitalized,
a myelogram was performed. Thereafter, Dr. Hall excised a bulging disc which was seen to be present on the
floor of the canal. At the time of the hospitalization,
the hospital record, made under the direction and control of Dr. Hall, stated:
"This 23-year old male, presents with the chief
complaint of low back pain an.i radiation into
6

the right leg since he was injured on the job approximately six months ago," (Tr. 130)
On October 6, Dr. Hall wrote into the record, the following:
"Intermittent low back pain with right sciatic for
the pa·st several months. Two or three days missed from work. Some minor neurological abnormal findings in October 1968. Today straig}it
leg rising is markedly positive on both sides."
Dr. Hall further testified that there is a difference between a herniated disc and a degenerative disc in that
in a degenerative situation the disc material is soft,
spongy, does not lvok healthy or normal; that in a
herniated disc situation the disc will be fragmented or
bulging. That at the time of the operation, plaintiff's
disc was of the bulging type and that that was what
he meant in his hospital records rather than that the
disc material was degenerative, soft, dull or spongy appearing. It was the belief of Dr. Hall that the November 25, 1967 accident probably initiated the disc problem and that the accident of October 17, 1968 further
aggravated the situation (Tr. 164).
It was the opinion of Dr. Pemberton that in the
absence of any history of other injury and that if the
man, prior to the time he fell on October 17, had been
able to oontinue his ordinary work and was not under
medical care because of a disability, that he probably
injured his back at the time of the fall (Tr. 110).
It is undisputed that the plaintiff returned to work
on February 7, 1968 (Tr. 157). Between February 7,

7

1968 and until October 17, 1968, the time of the second
accident, plaintiff lost no time off as a result of injury
(Tr. 175).

STATEMEN'l1 OF POINrcs RELIED UPON
1. rl1hat the verdict, no cause of action, on plaintiff's second cause, to-wit: the accident of October 17,
1968, was contrai·y to law and any evidence.
2. That the court erred in refusing to instruct the
jury that they should find the
dated March 22,
1968, invalid if they further found that the plaintiff suffered an injury to his back or spine in the accident of
November 25, 1967.
3. The court erred m submitting the special rnterrogatory to the jury.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THE VERDIC'l1, NO CAUSE OF ACTION, ON
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE, TO--WIT: THE
ACCIDENT OF OCTOBER 17, 1%8, WAS CONTRARY TO LAW AND ANY EVIDENCE:
The plaintiff testified under oath that he was riding on the side of a box car containing a cut of cars,
that when the movement stopped he dismounted, that
his foot came down upon a bridle rod platf-' which moved, permitting his foot to slip between the ties and the
bridle rod spraining his ankle, causing him to twist and
fall, hurting his back.
His version of the incident is substantiated by the

8

switch foreman, Mr. Hannigan, who stated that he saw
the plaintiff on the side of a car, he didn't see him dismount because he was having a conversation with the
yard master, that immediately upon the conclusion of
that conversation, he went to the switch and the plaintiff, that he found the switch plate between the ties,
that all of the spikes which should have been in place
to secure the bridle rod plate were absent, that the plaintiff was in obvious pain, holding his back, said that he
had fallen. Mr. Hannigan further testified that he had
worked with the plaintiff previously, that at no time
had he been unable to perform his duties, that at no time
had he complained of any back or spine difficulties.
Subsequent to the pliaintiff's return to work on February 7, 1968, following the November 25, 1967 accident,
the plaintiff had worked each and every day until the
October 17, 1968 accident.
The rec-ord discloses no
other incident and/or injuries. When Dr. Hall hospitalized the plaintiff the following April and operated
upon him, he found a bulging or extruding disc, not a
degenerative disc. Dr. Hall believed that this October
17, 1968 episode caused an aggravation of a pre-existing condition which did in fact result in the bulging disc.
The plaintiff's testimony was in fact supported in many
crucial points by competent, independent, unbiased testimony.
The defendant railroad offered no testimony to
dispute the October 17 incident. It offered no testimony
to the effect that plaintiff suffered at least an aggravation if not an en tirely new injury. The jury's verdict
was contrary to every bit of sworn testimony presented
1
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to it. To find that he was not hurt or that the accident
did not occur would require findings entirely beyond
the scope of the testimony.
The court submitted this point to the jury on the
following instructions :
19.

One who undertakes to provide equipment
or appliances for the safety and use of
another assumes a duty to furnish it in a
safe and proper manner. Such person is
liable for injuries which may result which
are caused in whole or in part by the failure to furnish a proper and reasonably
safe device.

20.

It was the duty of the defrndant railroad to
to use ordinary care to keep the bridle
rod plate in place and properly secured,
if you find from the consideration of all
the evidence resulted in injuries to the plaintiff occurred in whole or in part from the
failure of the defendant to properly place
and secure said equipment or both, you may
find that such defect or defects were known
or in the exercise of ordinary care should
have been known to the railroad prior to
the accident, then you will find the defendant railroad was negligent with respect
thereto and if you further find that such
negligence contributed in whole or in part
to the 'accident of October 18, 1968, your
verdict will be in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant.

10

24.

It was the duty of the defendant railroad
to keep its bridle rod plate in such a place
and so secured that an injury would not
likely result to any employeP standing, walking or stepping thereon.

25.

If the defendant railroad knows of the
existence of a defective or a hazardous condition or in the exercise of ordinary care
should have known of the existence of such
conditions, it has the duty to warn or instruct its employees ·of the existence of such
condition or defect.

27.

An employee of a railroad does not have
to anticipate or expect that the railroad or
its agents or employees will be guilty of
negligence. On the contrary, he may assume
and expect that said railroa,d, its agents and
employees will so conduct themselves in a
safe and proper manner so as to provide
him with a safe place to work. This assumption and expectation shall continue until such time as he knows or should know
in the exercise of ordinary care that the
contrary is true.
1

34.

Plaintiff is entitled to recover all damages
proximately resulting from the negligence,
if any, of the defendant, even though such
negligence merely 'aggravated a pre-existing physical condition. A defendant cannot
invoke the previous condition of the person
11

injured for the purpose of Pscaping the consequences of his own negli!;ence, or reducing
the damages for which he is liable. Plaintiff is entitled to recover for all damages
which he has suffered and which were proximately caused in whole or in part by defendant's negligence.
The only liability instruction that the defendant
excepted to was plaintiff's proposed number 14, which
was the Court's instruction 20, and the basis of that
instruction was that the Court didn't instruct that the
railroad's duty was to exercrise ordinary and responable
care. An examination of the instructions disclose that
the objection is not vialid because the first sentence of
the instruction so states the duty of ordinary, reasonable care.
There can be no reasonable question that the bridle
rod plate was not secured at all, that the four spikes
required to secure it were not in place or in evidence
and that the section crew of the defendant had, in fact
neglected to perform their duty. The jury in finding
no breach of duty or no injury or both, had to ignore
all iof the evidence introduced at the trial because no
evidence was introduced that in any way contradicted,
disputed or denied either liability or damage.
There is no question but that plaintiff ultimately
suffered a ruptured disc. If the judg-ment of the jury
in the first cau.se of action is to be sustained, it is essential to conclude that they found that the plaintiff
suffered no spine or disc injury on November 25, 1967.
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To find otherwise would be to repudiate not only their
verdict but the reply to their special interrogatory.
'l'o sustain the first cause of action it is necessary to
find that the entire back injury was created and caused
hy the October 17, 1968 injury. Ever. though a jury
Jid not so conclude and concluded that the plaintiff suffered only an aggravation at the time of October 17, 1968,
it tloes not help either the defendant or the validity of
their verdict beeause an aggravation is in legal effect a
compensable injury. Where a person's injuries are aggravated by a second injury, subsequent to the original
damage, it is the general rule of law that the second
injury is corn;idered a distinct intervening cause and
cannot be attributable to the first accident so that a
wrong doer who is responsible for _,he first injury will
be held only liable for the first injury and not for any
aggravation thereof. Conversely, the party responsible
for the aggravation is not held liable for the first injury,
9 ALR 255s. 20 ALR 524; 76 ALR 1285, Restatement of
Torts Section 4-10; 22 Am Jur 2d Damages, Section 115.
This precise defendant was involved. in just such a
decision in Denver and Rio Grande Railroad vs Roller
9th Cir. Calif. 100 F. 738.
For the jury to find that
the herniated disc was created neither by the accident
of November 25, 1967 or the accident of October 17,
1968, would require them to find that the injury was
caused by some traruna and/or incidPut not described
in the record in any place. It would require a finding
that the cause was an occurrence outsi.de the record.
If the jury in reaching its conclusion is compelled
to do so ba,sed upon the facts presented to it, the verdict is without basis in fact.
13

Wigmore 3rd Edition, Section 2570, states:
"The jury may in modern times act only upon
evidence properly laid before
in the oourse
of a trial."
The text goes on to say that there is one area in which
men generally have a common fund of knowledge and
experience and that the jury is allowed to resort to
this information in making up their minds; however,
in discussing this exception, Wigmore states, page 544:
"But the scope of this doctrine is narrow; it is
strictly limited to a few matters of elemental
experience in human nature, commercial affairs
and every day life. Thus the natural instincts
of human conduct with reference to care or negligence at a time of danger may be considered,
the dangerousness of smoking a pipe in a barn
near straw, the conditions affecting the various
kinds of values, the intoxicating nature of a certain liquor, and even though thi::; illustrates how
looal 0onditions may affect the application, that
a game played with bone counters is played for
money. But such a matter of private and variable
belief as the character of a particular witness
cannot be taken into consideration by the jury."
This has long been the view in Utah. In Hathaway
vs United Tintic Mines Company 42 Utah 520 132 P.
388, the court said :
"There is no evidence whatewff in the record
from which the ciourt could legally determine
that the respondent had in an.v particular com14

plied with the terms of the mechanics lien statute.
There is no evidence whatevP1 that notice of
intention to file a lien was evrr made or filed
as required by our lien law, N otwithstandinpthe denials and the answer and that no evidence
whatever was adduced at the hearing with respect to the matters just stated, the court nevertheless found the facts showing that the respondent had complied with the provisions of our
mechanics lien statute and hence was entitled
to a lien against certain
claims . . . the
finding of facts and entering of judgments are
solemn acts and no court should permit itself
to make a finding of fact where the record is
conclusive as in this case, that there is absolutely no evidence to support such a finding."
If the court cannot find facts outside the record
it should certainly follow that a jury is not so privileged.

More recently in Provo Water Users Association
vs Carlson, 133 Utah 93 133 P. 2d 777, the court said:
"The purpose of a trial of the issues is to have
the facts determined impartially and fairly by a
court or jury. Jurors as well as judges must
baise their verdicts or decisions upon the evidence presented during the trial, not upon the
basis of some independent personal investigation
or determination of the facts outside the court."
The findings of the jury as they relate to the second
cause of action are contrary to fact and law and should
be reversed.

POINT II
THAT THE COUR'l1 ERRED IN REFUSING r.1_10
INSTRUCT '11 HE JURY THAT THEY SHOULD
FIND THE RELEASE DA 'l ED l\I ARCH 22, 1968,
INVALID IF THEY FURTHER FOUND THAT THE
PLAINTIFF SUFFERED AN IN.JURY TO HIS
BACK OR SPINE IN THE ACCIDENT OF NOVEMBER 25, 1967.
1

The uncontradicted evidence proves that the plaintiff suffered a rolling, crushing-type injury on N ovember 25, 1967. '11 hat he incurred fractures of the 9th,
10th and 11th rib and a probable fracture of the ilium.
That he was thereafter treated by two physicians, both
of whom advised him orally and in writing that he had
no permanent injury and no injury to his back or
spine. It is further uncontradicted that the defendant
:railroad had received copies of the written reports and
blad no knowledge contrary to that set forth in those
reports. It is finally uncontradicted that the plaintiff executed the release relying upon the information,
provided him by the doctors and that lie would not
have executed a release had he known or been advised
of even a possibility of a spine or di '3C defect if the
diagnosis of Dr. Charles Hall is correct, and that he
did suffer a disc defect on November 2G, 1967, that.
fact was unlmown to the plaintiff, the defendant, or
any of the attending doctors.
It 1s conceded that the Supreme Court of the

United States in Collier vs Penna. Railroad Company, 232 U. S. 625, 92 L. Ed. 242, held that the burden
16
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of proving that a release should be vacated was on
the plaintiff and that in Dice vs the Akron, Canton
and Youngstown Railrnad Company, 3-1-2, U. S. 359, 96
L. Ed. 398 held that the burden imposed upon the
party attempting to vacate or set aside a release need
to do so only by a preponderance or gre'ater weight of
the evidence.
The cases bearing upon this problem eX'tending as
far back as 1942, Matthews vs the Atchison Topeka and
Santa Fe Railroad Company 129 P. 2d 435, held that a
plaintiff who relied upon the physician of the defendant
railroad and believed, as a result, that he had recovered,
was a statement of fact if believed by the plaintiff and
also by the physician, the case is one of mutual mistake.
This was followed by a long line of cases : Union
Pacific Railroad Company vs Zimmer, Cal. 1948, 197
P. 2d 367; Graham vs Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe
Railroad Co. 9th Cir. 1949; Kirchgestner vs Denver and
Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. 1950, 118 Utah 20,
218 P. 2d 685; Camerlin vs New York Central Railroad
5th Cir. 1952 199 F. 2d 698; Allison vs Chicago Great
Western Railroad Co., Minn. 1954, 62 N. W. 2d 374;
Locke vs Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Co.
309 F. 2d 811.
Perhaps the best way to summarize the above cases
is the language of the Supreme Court of Utah in the
Kirchgestner vs D&RG Western Railroad Company
case wherein the Court stated:
"Because a release is as all-inclusive in its terms
as legal ingenuity may make it and purports to
17

release all possible claims ansrng out of an accident and is understood as such by the releasor,
it will nevertheless be set asid!> when it can be
shown that at the time of its execution both
parties were laboring under a mutual mistake
as to the extent of the injuries suffered by the
releasor."
The uncontradicted evidence here is at the time of
the execution of the release on March 22, 1968, no one,
the plaintiff, the defendant, or any doctor knew of any
back or disc defect.
The only case where the facts wPre undisputed is
that of Washburn vs Terminal Railroad Ass'n of St.
Loui,s, Ill. 252 N.K 2d 389. In that case the trial court
directed the verdict in :favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant railroad from which the defendant appealed arguing tha:t the release was obtained on a mutual
mistake of facts as regards to plaintiff'·s medical condition. The trial court was sustained, the court saying
in part:
"There is nothing m the F<.>deral Employers'
Liability Act or the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States which precludes the
direction of a verdict in a prover case, Rogers
v Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500,
77 S. Ct. 443, 1 L. Ed. 2d 493."
The Court concluded saying:
"Even though the release purports to release defendant from all claims for injuries, symptoms
and conditions, present and future, connected
18

with, or arising out of the occurrence in question,
and further recites that plaintiff fully informed
himself of its contents and knew what it contained, if its execution resulted from a mutual
mistake of fact as to the extent and permanence
of plaintiff's injuries, it was inYalid. Under the
circumstances, the trial 0ourt did not err in taking the issue of the validity of the release from
the jury."
It is respectfully submitted

that a jury had the
prerogative of finding whether, in its opinion, a disc
condition <lid result from the accident of November 25,
1967. That if it did not, there was no dispute as to the
fact that the release was valid on its face. If, on the
other hand, it found that a disc oondition was created
by the accident of November 25, 1967, on basis of the
uncontradicted evidence herein, the court was obligated
to grant plaintiff's motion and direct the jury that in
such event the release should be invalid and that they
should then assess damages for the total result of all
the injuries that the plaintiff had sustained as a result
of that accident.
POINT III

THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITT[NG THE SPECIAL IN'l1 ERROGATORY TO THE; JURY
The court submitted the following interrogatory

to the jury:

"Was the release entered into March 22, 1968 and
executed by the plaintiff, a valid and
binding release of all claims of the plaintiff
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against the defendant by mason of the occurrence
of November 25, 1967."
The jury answered "yes".
Rule 49b of the Rules of Civil Procedure specifical.
ly authorize a general verdict being supplemented by
answer to interrogatories. The rule mys in part:
"The court may submit to the jury, together with
appropriate forms for a general verdict, written
interrogatories upon which one or more issues
of fact, the decision of which is necessary to a
verdict. The court shall give such explanation I
or instruction as may be necessary to enable the (
jury both to make answers to the interrogatories (
and to render a general verdict, and the court
I
shall direct the jury both to make written answers and to render a general verdict."
The difficulty with the interrogatory propounded
is throt it does not call for a finding of fact upon which
a general verdict is based, but calls instead for a conclusion of law. That conclusion of law should have been
made by the court who refused to do so although the
evidence was undisputed and clearly showed that there
was no question of fact to be determined by the jury,
that only the question of law as to whether or not the
release was applicable in the event they found that the
plaintiff did in fact suffer a back or disc defect in the
November 1967 accident.
Plaintiff argued this matter in a motion for a new
trial and at that time suggested that ;;uch interrogatory
was incorrect and that in lieu thereof the following
questions should have been asked:
20

I

I
'

I

1.

Did the plaintiff suffer a back or disc defect
as a result of the injury of November 25,
1967.

2.

On March 22, 1968, did the plaintiff know of
said defect.

3.

On March 22, 1968, did any treating physician
know of the existence of said defect.

4.

Did the railroad, on March 22, 1968, know
of said defect.

5.

If the answers to 2, 3, and 4 are found in the

affirmative, did the plaintiff, the treating
physicians, or the railroad have any reason
to believe that said defect would result in a
herniated disc.

An examination of the rule discloses that the purpose of the rule is to permit the court to find upon what
facts the court based its judgment. '1.1his could not be
accomplished by the submission of the written interrogatory because neither the court nor any party can
determine therefrom what the jury determined the facts
to be.
CONCLUSION
It is impossible to reconcile the verdict of the jury
unless one concludes fr.om the evidence that the jury
concluded that the rele'a:se executed March 22, 1968 covered any and all subsequent developments which might
be attached to or claim to be attached to the original
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injury. If they so found, and if they so found that such
further injuries were covered by the release, it would
then follow that they would find that the release was
valid and that there should be no recovery on the second
cause of action. The difficulty with this analysis is that
it is contrary to fact and law ]f his back or spine defect
was related in part to the first accident then, as a matter
of law, the jury was bound to find that the release was
invalid. If, on the other hand, they found that there
was no back or spine defect as a result of the first accident, then on the basis of the instrnctions, the facts,
the uncontradicted evidence, they were compelled to find
a minimum of an aggraviation of a pre-existing condition and should have awarded the plaintiff damages,
however slight, for the new injury which he sustained
as a result of the aggravation. There is no evidence
in this record to sustain a different conclusion on any
of the issues as to negligence, liability or injury.
Respectfully submitited.
C. C. PATTERSON and
ROBERT V. PHILLIPS
Attorney for Plaintif-Appellant
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